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INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDER LIABILITY FOR 
CONTRIBUTORY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AFTER GUCCI 
In Gucci America v. Hall Associates (2001), the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York held that the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”) did not grant Internet service providers (“ISPs”) 
blanket immunity from contributory liability for trademark infringement.1  
Given the likelihood that ISPs will host some sites that infringe under the 
Lanham Act2, this iBrief discusses the policy implications of a refusal to 
extend immunity for some types of tort liability under the CDA to the 
intellectual property arena.  
Introduction 
Gucci Background 
The plaintiff in Gucci owned the famous trademark and trade name of “GUCCI” used on 
jewelry and related apparel.3  Mindspring (since merged to become EarthLink, Inc.) was the ISP 
hosting defendant Hall’s website at the URL http://www.goldhaus.com.4  The plaintiff allegedly 
notified Mindspring twice via e-mail that the goldhaus website engaged in acts of trademark 
infringement and unfair competition by advertising jewelry on the site that infringed the Gucci 
trademark.5  The plaintiff further alleged that Mindspring continued to allow Hall to use its web 
hosting services, despite “actual knowledge of, or in reckless disregard of” the trademark 
infringement.6 
Gucci asserted claims against Mindspring for both direct and contributory trademark 
infringement under § 32(1) of the Lanham Act.7  The plaintiff also brought claims under § 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act for false designations of origin and false descriptions and representations, as 
well as trademark infringement and unfair competition claims under New York common law.8  
Mindspring then brought a motion to dismiss based upon two grounds: (1) that the CDA 
immunized Mindspring from liability for the information on Hall’s website; and (2) that the First 
                                                     
1 Gucci America, Inc. v. Hall & Associates, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
2 See Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”) § 32, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000). 
3 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 410. 
4 Id. at 410-11. 
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Amendment barred the plaintiff’s trademark infringement theory.9  Although the Lanham Act 
does not address either contributory or vicarious liability for copyright infringement, courts have 
used common law concepts to apply these to indirect infringers.10  The court in Gucci denied 
Mindspring’s motion to dismiss on a contributory infringement theory, holding that the CDA did 
not immunize the ISP from an infringement claim.11  What makes this decision, and those 
following it, so significant, is that a great deal of uncertainty regarding the issues existed 
beforehand, as evidenced by Mindspring’s claim of blanket immunity.12 
Scope of Analysis 
This iBrief first analyzes the CDA immunity aspect of the Gucci decision and then 
examines the implications of that decision and the direction in which courts are moving.  The 
First Amendment and innocent infringer arguments raised in Gucci remain outside the scope of 
the CDA immunity question, but are addressed as far as they concern the knowledge requirement 
for contributory liability.13  This iBrief will not address vicarious liability, for which there must 
also be “an apparent partnership between the defendant and the direct infringer, that one has 
authority to bind the other or exercise control over the product at issue.”14  This partnership 
relationship is not typical of the ISP/website relationship, which is more distant.  The intention of 
this iBrief is not to establish what constitutes direct trademark infringement by a website, but to 
instead address the issue of contributory liability of an ISP once it has been determined that a 
trademark has been directly infringed. 
Limitation of CDA Immunity Under Gucci 
The Statutory Language 
In examining the issue of CDA immunity from contributory liability for trademark 
infringement, the district court first looked to the statutory language.  Mindspring argued that § 
                                                     
9 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 411. 
10 Nicole A. Wong, et al., Online Content Liability Issues, 711 PLI/Pat 813, 944 (July 2002). 
11 See generally Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d 409. 
12 Jonathan E. Moskin, Navigating Choppy Waters in Safe Harbors: Contributory Liability of 
Internet Service Providers (July 2001), at 
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(Nov. 3, 2002). 
13 See Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 417-22 (discussing the First Amendment and innocent infringer 
defenses raised by Mindspring). 
14 Wong, et. al, supra note 10, at 945.  Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Svcs., Inc., 
955 F.2d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1992). 
230(c)(1) of the CDA immunized it from contributory liability.15  Congress enacted § 230 of the 
CDA in 1996 to provide a safe harbor for ISPs from contributory liability for the content of web 
sites that they host: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”16  
Section 230 was one of the few left intact after the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Reno v. ACLU.17  
No dispute existed in Gucci that Mindspring, as an ISP, fit the definition of an “interactive 
computer service” under § 230(f)(2).18  Section 230(e)(2), however, specifically states that 
“[n]othing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual 
property.”19  The court found that “[t]he plain language of Section 230(e)(2) precludes 
Mindspring’s claim of immunity.”20 
Despite this apparent bar to extending immunity to trademark infringement, the court 
addressed Mindspring’s argument that immunity would not “limit” or “expand” any IP laws 
because such contributory liability for trademark infringement had never before been imposed on 
an ISP.21  The court declined, however, “to incorporate or read into the statute a temporal limit,” 
stating that nothing in § 230 indicated a limit of § 230(e)(2) to IP laws “as they existed in 
1996.”22 
Relevant Case Law 
Although the court found that the plain meaning of § 230(e)(2) ended its necessary 
inquiry, it went further to analyze Mindspring’s other arguments.23  It next looked to relevant case 
law interpreting § 230 generally, beginning with Zeran v. America Online, Inc.24  Zeran held that 
§ 230 “precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in 
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20 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 413. 
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23 Id. at 414. 
a publisher’s role.”25  The Gucci court specifically distinguished Zeran on the grounds that it 
applied to “defamation and other forms of tort liability” while the claims in Gucci were 
“grounded in the law of intellectual property” and thus did not raise a § 230 immunity question.26 
Mindspring also argued that Lockheed Martin v. Network Solutions27 rejected the 
application of contributory trademark infringement in the Internet context. The Gucci court, 
however, agreed with the plaintiff that Lockheed Martin did not preclude contributory liability of 
ISPs for trademark infringement, but merely held that registration of a domain name does not 
qualify as use in commerce (which is required for infringement under the Lanham Act).28  The 
bases for contributory trademark infringement examined in Lockheed Martin were analyzed 
under the test for contributory trademark infringement outlined by the Supreme Court in Inwood 
Labs:  
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe 
a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows 
or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement, the 
manufacturer or distributor is contributorially responsible for any harm 
done as a result of the deceit.29   
In Lockheed Martin, the court found that there was no evidence of inducement to infringe, so the 
contributory trademark infringement claim rested on whether the domain name registrar had 
knowledge of the infringement under the Inwood test.30  The Lockheed Martin court found that 
there was no knowledge in the case of the domain name registrar.31  The appeals court, affirming 
the district court’s decision, also declined to extend the contributory trademark infringement 
theory advanced in two other cases.32  Gucci distinguished mere registration of a domain name 
                                                                                                                                                              
24 Id. at 414-15.  See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the CDA created federal immunity to claims against an ISP for failure to remove defamatory 
messages posted by a third party). 
25 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
26 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 415. 
27 Id. at 416.  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D.Cal. 
1997), aff’d, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a registrar of domain names was not 
liable for contributory trademark infringement where trademark was infringed by domain names 
registered by third party). 
28 Gucci, 135 F.Supp. 2d at 416.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (“use in commerce”); § 1114(1)(b) 
(“intended to be used in commerce”); § 1125(a)(1) (“uses in commerce”). 
29 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982), quoted in 
Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996), quoted in Lockheed 
Martin, 985 F.Supp. at 960-61.  
30 Lockheed Martin, 985 F. Supp. at 961. 
31 Id. 
32 Id.  See Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265 (holding that the landlord-
tenant relationship between a flea market operator and vendors was a basis for imposing 
from hosting of content, and the court pointed out that Lockheed Martin itself contrasted the role 
of a domain name registrar with that of an ISP.33  There is a more tangible connection between an 
ISP and its hosted websites than between a domain name registrar and the names it registers. 
Mindspring also argued that copyright law developments supported its assertion that 
immunity under the CDA would not limit existing trademark law.34  It claimed that Congress had 
the opportunity in enacting the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (“DMCA”) to “alter 
the extent to which ISPs may assert statutory immunity from trademark infringement” and had 
not done so.35  The court rejected the argument that the DMCA’s protection from copyright 
liability extends to trademarks.36  The DMCA’s enactment only two years after the CDA actually 
reinforced the assertion that § 230 does not provide immunity to ISPs from all intellectual 
property claims, as doing so “would render the immunities created by the DMCA from copyright 
actions superfluous.”37  Developments in copyright law actually worked against such an assertion 
in trademark law, despite granting greater immunity from contributory liability. 
Legislative History 
Even though Mindspring conceded that no legislative history existed as to subsection 
(e)(2), it claimed that the “general legislative history of Section 230” supported its claim of CDA 
immunity.38  There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that § 230 was meant to apply to 
IP law.  In fact, the legislative history specifically states that Congress enacted § 230 with the 
goal of “online family empowerment.”39  The House Report goes even further in stating that 
“[o]ne of the specific purposes of this section is to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any 
other similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of 
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material 
[emphasis added].”40  Accordingly, the Gucci court found that the legislative history showed only 
                                                                                                                                                              
contributory trademark infringement where there was willful blindness of the market operator 
toward blatantly infringing acts by vendors). 
33 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 417. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 86 (1996). 
40 Id. at 194.  See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1995) (This case viewed an ISP as a publisher, subjecting it more easily to contributory 
liability because it took steps to control content). 
that § 230(c) immunizes ISPs from defamation and non-IP state law claims resulting from third-
party content.41 
The Zeran decision discussed in Gucci also reflects the policy choices made by Congress 
not to immunize ISPs against IP-related claims.42  Section 230 specifically precludes claims that 
place computer service providers into the roles of publishers.43  ISPs do not carry out these 
traditional publishing roles, and it follows that they should not be held liable in these areas. 
Congress chose “not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort 
liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious 
messages.”44  Section 230 was enacted in part, according to Zeran, “to maintain the robust nature 
of Internet communication” and to curb government regulation of online speech.45 
Implications 
Other Issues in Gucci 
Though not directly within the scope of the CDA immunity issue, Mindspring raised 
several other issues that go to the issue of what constitutes knowledge for the purposes of 
contributory trademark infringement.  Foremost among these was a First Amendment claim that 
the plaintiff advocated a “strict [or notice-based] liability” where an ISP does not immediately 
censor disputed speech.46  The court dispensed with this contention by pointing out that there was 
no “additional expressive element or ... communicative message that went beyond commercial 
identification of the source of a product” present in this case.47  Furthermore, the “innocent 
infringer defense” available under § 32(2) of the Lanham Act undermined Mindspring’s argument 
that strict or notice-based liability would arise without CDA immunity.48  This defense would 
limit the remedies of the plaintiff to an injunction against future printing or transmission of the 
mark.49  Plaintiffs must also show “actual malice” to recover damages, thus satisfying First 
Amendment requirements.50 
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50 Gucci, 135 F.Supp.2d at 420.  (Using New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) to 
derive an actual malice standard for contributory trademark infringement as acting “either (1) 
Mindspring also asserted that the First Amendment free speech issue is especially 
important in dealing with the Internet.51  But the court distinguished the importance of this issue 
in the trademark area from its importance in defamation and other torts, as addressed by the 
congressional policy decision outlined in Zeran.52 
Other Recent Decisions 
In Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com (2001), the district court denied a supplemental 
motion to dismiss Great Domains from a trademark infringement suit where the motion was filed 
pursuant to CDA § 230.53  Great Domains claimed to be an “interactive computer service 
provider” within the CDA definition and thus immune from contributory liability for the 
trademark infringement claim.54  The district court found that whether the motion to dismiss 
would succeed must be determined without the use of the CDA, citing Gucci’s plain language 
interpretation of CDA § 230(e)(2) as expressly precluding its application to the case.55  This is yet 
another move toward clarification of defenses against contributory liability for trademark 
infringement by service providers. 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc. (2002), the plaintiff claimed that the 
operator of an online age verification service was liable for contributory infringement of its 
trademark.56  The plaintiff did not argue that there was intentionally induced infringement, and 
the court found that the claim thus centered around the Fonovisa test of whether the defendant 
“knows or has reason to know of the infringing activity” and liability applied specifically to 
“those who are ‘willfully blind’ to such activity.”57  While not mentioning the CDA, the district 
court declined to extend any CDA defense to this case, as the defendant could be subject to 
contributory liability if it knew or should have known that infringement was taking place.58 
                                                                                                                                                              
with knowledge of the infringement or (2) with reckless disregard as to whether the material 
infringed the trademark owner’s rights.”)   
51 Gucci, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 420-21. 
52 Id. at 421. 
53 Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 2001 WL 1176319, 1 (E.D.Mich. 2001) (order 
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54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F.Supp. 2d 1146, 1188 (C.D.Cal. 2002) 
(granting motion for preliminary injunction). 
57 Id. at 1188-89, discussing Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 265. 
58 Id. 
Conclusion 
What Qualifies as Knowledge? 
The First Amendment concerns raised in Gucci and the need to show “actual malice” to 
recover damages necessitate a clearer standard of what qualifies as knowledge.  Notice may not 
be sufficient to qualify as “knowledge” within the definition of trademark infringement.59  There 
are some policy problems in saying that notification means knowledge.  ISPs could be given 
“notice” of frivolous infringement claims, thus forcing them to take action where no infringement 
had in fact occurred.  Calling for excessive proactive measures by ISPs to ferret out trademark 
infringement would also be burdensome, especially given the number of sites they host.  This 
calls for caution in going after ISPs where infringers can put forth content easily and 
anonymously, as is often the case on the Internet.60 
Also, if one takes the view of an ISP as an intermediary, the prudent policy decision 
would call for direct enforcement of trademark rights against the infringing party, and not the 
ISP.  Once it has been legally determined, however, that a website is infringing, and if the ISP is 
given adequate notice, it is also appropriate policy to hold the ISP accountable for continuing to 
aid in the illegal infringement.  From this standpoint, the Gucci decision seems to be moving in 
the direction of a clearer legal standard. 
Imposing a heightened duty of care on ISPs to troll the websites they host for instances of 
trademark infringement would be an undue burden.  This is especially true when the ISPs may 
not be part of a group that would easily recognize a given trademark, and ISPs could not be 
expected to keep track of every licensing agreement one of their sites makes with trademark 
owners. 
Closing the Door 
As part of a trend, the Gucci decision shows that ISPs and other services providers can no 
longer turn a blind eye to the activities of their users.61  As with copyright owners, if trademark 
owners cannot stop actual infringers, they may be more inclined in the future to go after ISPs that 
facilitate infringing behavior.62  The framework of Internet law was one where “the law is still 
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Leonard, Street and Deinard Publications (June 2001), at 
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60 Moskin, supra note 12 at 
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contending with already outdated perceptions of the Internet as a frontier society without rules ... 
If not already closed, the frontier is surely closing fast.”63  Although it seems that a reasonable 
middle ground will be reached in holding ISPs accountable for infringing behavior of their hosted 
websites, the days where ISPs did not share in the responsibility of what they help provide are 
fast coming to a close. 
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